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Abstract. The spread of autonomous systems into safety-critical areas has in-
creased the demand for their formal verification, not only due to stronger certi-
fication requirements but also to public uncertainty over these new technologies.
However, the complex nature of such systems, for example, the intricate combina-
tion of discrete and continuous aspects, ensures that whole system verification is
often infeasible. This motivates the need for novel analysis approaches that mod-
ularise the problem, allowing us to restrict our analysis to one particular aspect
of the system while abstracting away from others. For instance, while verifying
the real-time properties of an autonomous system we might hide the details of
the internal decision-making components. In this paper we describe verification
of a range of properties across distinct dimesnions on a practical hybrid agent
architecture. This allows us to verify the autonomous decision-making, real-time
aspects, and spatial aspects of an autonomous vehicle platooning system. This
modular approach also illustrates how both algorithmic and deductive verification
techniques can be applied for the analysis of different system subcomponents.
Keywords: Modular Verification · Hybrid Agent Architecture · Automata · Spatial
Reasoning · BDI Agent Programming
1 Introduction
Autonomous systems are increasingly being introduced into safety-critical areas, for
example nuclear waste management [2], domestic robotics [5], or transportation, in the
form of unmanned aircraft, advanced driver assistance systems, and even “driverless”
cars. Although autonomous cars are generally aimed at increasing the overall safety of
traffic, vehicle platooning [17,26], shown in Fig. 1 in particular provides even more ad-
vantages over single vehicles: it potentially decreases both congestion on motorways,
and fuel consumption, since the relative braking distance between vehicles should be
smaller, and hence the vehicles can make use of slipstreams with reduced wind resis-
tance. Here, vehicles are held in sequence on a highway, with distances and speeds con-
trolled by the platoon rather than the individual vehicle. Platooning has been recognised
as a valuable means to achieve these goals, and is encouraged politically, for instance,
by the Department of Transport of the United Kingdom1.
? Work supported EPSRC grants EP/N007565 (Science of Sensor Systems Software),
EP/R026092 (FAIR-SPACE RAI Hub) and EP/L024845/1 (Verifiable Autonomy).
1 https://trl.co.uk/news/news/government-gives-green-light-first-
operational-vehicle-platooning-trial
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Autonomous vehicles within a platoon need to be verified to ensure the overall
safety of the platoon. Specifically both autonomous decision-making concerning leav-
ing/joining the platoon, and low-level interaction with its environment have to be anal-
ysed, in the best case by providing guarantees for reliable behaviour. To certify the high-
level decisions of an individual autonomous system, the rational agent concept [27] is
widely used, since it allows for an analysis of the reasons why an autonomous system
chooses a certain action.
The physical interaction of a vehicle with the rest of the platoon of vehicles in its
environment consists of several different dimensions. Two of the most important are
time and space. Timing constraints are of major importance to the overall behaviour of
a system. For example, if an unsafe situation is encountered, the vehicles have to react
within a certain time frame to ensure safety during emergencies. But even for normal
vehicle behaviour, such as joining or leaving a platoon, time constraints are eminently
important [8]. Spatial aspects are vital for similar reasons. Ensuring that vehicles do not
get too close, or can fit in the space they are trying to move in to, is clearly important.
So now we reach the key problem. A complex, autonomous system such as an au-
tomotive vehicle platoon, will incorporate a diverse range of properties and behaviours.
If we wish to formally verify all of these dimensions together then we will certainly
hit complexity issues — multi-dimensional formalisation easily become very com-
plex [7,14]. Two approaches are either to use modular verification techniques [19] or to
use abstraction techniques [10] to separate out dimensions of concern.
A
F4 F3 F2 F1 L
Fig. 1: Vehicle Platooning — vehicle A joining interior of platoon
Our Approach. We have identified three key dimensions within autonomous vehicle
platoons that we wish to assess: autonomous decision-making, real-time properties,
and spatial properties. We also aim to minimise the change to existing components
of the system when new components are introduced. Consequently, we use abstraction
techniques for the three dimensions, but ensure that verification results for parts of the
system that are unchanged remain valid, and so the verification task is reduced to check-
ing any new system components. We show the applicability of this approach by taking
an existing autonomous vehicle platoon system whose decision-making and real-time
properties have already been verified, in [18], and incorporating spatial aspects. A spa-
tial controller is introduced to model the lane-changing behaviour of the vehicles in
the platoon. This was something that the original platoon verification from [18] did not
consider and we now show that not only does the high-level decision making (agent)
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code remain unchanged, but since the spatial aspects were shown to be correct in [15],
the new verification task is reduced to the analysis of the real-time requirements.
Consequently, we show how this modular verification approach supports the flexi-
bility of the underlying hybrid agent architecture, with any new components of the ex-
tended architecture still being verifiable. The verification of such architectures remains
feasible as long as we can apply appropriate abstraction to the system components.
2 Hybrid Agent Architecture
Cyber-physical systems, such as autonomous vehicles, require a sophisticated archi-
tecture together with corresponding formalism. Practical systems combine continuous
environmental interactions, through feedback control, together with discrete changes
between these control regimes. In traditional hybrid systems, separating the high-level
decision making from continuous control concerns is difficult. The other drawback of
standard hybrid modelling approaches is that the representation of decision-making
can become very complex and hard to distinguish. We utilise a hybrid agent archi-
tecture [20] where the decision-making aspect is separated into a distinguished ‘agent’
while the system still provides for traditional feedback control systems. This approach
to the modelling and development of autonomous systems provides a clear separation
between these two concerns, and also the behaviour of each component is described in
much more detail that can contribute to reason about their behaviours separately. Thus,
the separation of high-level decision making and low-level controllers within a hybrid
agent architecture provides an infrastructure for modular verification.
In this paper, we use a hybrid agent architecture, proposed for autonomous vehicle
platooning in [18], as shown in Fig. 2. A Decision-Making Agent instructs a Physical
and Continuous Engine by passing instructions through an Abstraction Agent. The Ab-
straction Agent receives streams of continuous data from the Physical and Continuous
Engines, extracts discrete information from this, and sends it to the decision-making
agent. The Physical and Continuous engine manages the real-time continuous control
of the vehicle through feedback controllers, implemented in MATLAB. We assumed
that the dynamics of the vehicles are continuous, i.e., they may not arbitrarily change
positions and velocities. An automotive simulator, TORCS 2, is used to implement the
automotive environment and this environment is observed through the sensory input by
the Physical and Continuous engine.
The Decision-Making Agent is a rational agent [27] that not only makes decisions,
but will have explicit reasons for making these decisions. This allows us to describe
what the autonomous system chooses to do, and to reason about why it makes its
choices. Our Decision-Making Agent is based on the BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention)
paradigm. Here, beliefs represent the agent’s views about the world, desires provide
the long-term objectives to be accomplished, and intentions capture the set of goals
currently being undertaken by the agent in order to achieve its desires.
The separation between the Decision-Making Agent and the Physical and Continu-
ous Engine provides a way to verify the agent behaviour in isolation from the detail of
feedback control. In this work we utilise program model-checking over the Decision-
Making Agent. This allows us to formally verify the real agent code rather than a model
2 The Open Racing Car Simulator https://sourceforge.net/projects/torcs
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Fig. 2: Hybrid Agent Architecture [18]
of the agent behaviour. This formal verification of agent behaviour is carried out using
the AJPF model checker and the agent itself is implemented in the verifiable language
GWENDOLEN [11]. The model-checking approach using AJPF is used to demonstrate
that the BDI agent always behaves according to the platoon requirements and never
intentionally chooses unsafe options. Unfortunately, model checking of BDI agents
through AJPF is not only resource-heavy, but also lacks support for the formal ver-
ification of timed behaviours. As indicated above, timing will be a key principle of
relevance to safety-critical behaviour and so, to tackle this problem, Kamali et al. [18]
proposed a modular approach to the verification of automotive platoons constructed in
this way. They used a combination of AJPF, for internal agent decisions, and the Uppaal
model checker, for global timing behaviours.
We here consider two of the main platooning procedures involved in joining and
leaving a platoon. Both the joining and leaving procedures are comprised of a series
of communications between an individual vehicle and the platoon leader aimed to ob-
tain permission to join/leave or update the leader when the joining/leaving procedure is
accomplished. Apart from the required communications, the vehicle switches between
different controllers, such as moving from ‘manual’ to ‘automatic’ for speed and steer-
ing. One of the challenging manoeuvres is changing lanes and the high-level behaviour
of the platoon is verified under the assumption that the lane changing manoeuvre is
carried out safely. In order to accomplish the fully autonomous platooning while pre-
serving safety, we extend the previous work of [18] by adding spatial reasoning to the
platooning architecture. Representing space allows us to model the spatial controller of
the system and consequently to verify the safety of the spatial controller behaviours.
Both the idea, and the concrete definition of the spatial controller, is taken from
previous work [15]. The level of this spatial abstraction is still very high: we do not
refer to specific/metric distances, but instead associate regions of space with different,
abstract, properties. That is, we distinguish two different aspects of space needed by
a vehicle: its reservation and its claim. The intuition here is that the reservation of a
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vehicle denotes the part of space that is necessary for the vehicle to operate safely. It
comprises both the physical extent of the vehicle and the distance it needs to come
to a standstill in case of an emergency. The claim, however, is not as restrictive. It
is an additional way for the vehicles to communicate, similar to the turning signals
common to road vehicles. That is, a vehicle sets a claim somewhere on the motorway
to indicate its desire to occupy this part of the motorway in the (near) future. If the
vehicle decides that changing to the new lane is safe, it mutates its existing claim into
a reservation. Consequently, within our abstraction the vehicle is considered to be on
both lanes at once, thus modelling the act of changing lanes. For example, in Fig. 1, the
car A currently set a claim on the right lane, to join the platoon.
3 Methodology
In this section, we show how the hybrid agent architecture of Sect. 2 can be instanti-
ated to verify vehicle platooning with respect to the agent’s decisions, the continuous
behaviour, and the topological spatial changes necessary to change lanes, e.g., while
joining a platoon. To that end, we refine the instantiation of previous work [18] with
a new controller responsible for the spatial aspects of traffic, which in turn is inspired
by previous work of one of the authors [15]. Generally, our system consists of several
controllers, which constrain the possible behaviour of the vehicles on the road. This
implies, in particular, that the behaviour of the parallel product of two components is
a subset of the behaviour of each single component. To show the correctness of our
refinement step, we prove a set of proof obligations including deadlock freedom and in-
variant preservation. We also show that all the verified properties of autonomous vehicle
platooning presented in [18], hold after the refinement step.
Agent
Program
Vehicle Control
and Environment
Comm.Comm.
(a)
Agent
Program
Environment
Continuous
Controller
Spatial
Controller
Comm.Comm.
(b)
Fig. 3: Original and Refined Architecture
Fig. 3 shows both the original and refined architecture modelling an individual vehicle
within a platoon. The centre of the architecture consists of the agent program, which
makes autonomous decisions for the vehicle and may both communicate with other
agents via some communication channel, and with both a continuous controller and an
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environment (cf. Fig. 3a). A main feature of our approach is a translation of the differ-
ent components into simpler abstractions for verification purposes. That is, to verify the
agent program, we can abstract from the timing aspects of the continuous controller.
Thus we gain a simple (finite-state) timed automaton as the abstraction of the continu-
ous behaviour. Similarly, we can reduce the agent program to the few parts necessary
for the communication with the continuous controller for the verification of the latter.
In both cases, the state space is reduced significantly, making verification feasible, in
the case of the agent program by using AJPF [12] and in the case of the continuous
controller by using UPPAAL [6].
3.1 Agent
The BDI agent program in our architecture is written in GWENDOLEN [11], a prolog-
style programming language that incorporates explicit representation of goals, beliefs,
and plans. AJPF is a model checker that accepts GWENDOLEN code as an input model.
It allows for the specification and verification of agent properties with respect to beliefs
and intentions. Since the general interface between the underlying vehicle implemen-
tation and the agent is similar to [18], we could re-use that agent program with only
minor changes. We distinguish between two agent programs: the leader, which man-
ages all joining and leaving requests of vehicles within, or outside, the platoon, and the
follower, which defines the functionality of vehicles within the platoon.
We did not need to change the structure of the leader protocol, which is why we
subsequently concentrate on the follower. The follower currently implements the inter-
actions for four main features:
1. joining a platoon;
2. leaving a platoon;
3. switching the steering control between manual and automatic; and
4. setting a new distance to the front vehicle.
A vehicle intending to join to a platoon initially sends a joining request to the leader
and waits for confirmation from the leader. When it receives the confirmation, it in-
structs the vehicle to change lane and waits for the vehicle to send back a successful
confirmation of changing lane. After receiving the successful confirmation the follower
switches its speed controller to automatic. When the joining vehicle is close enough
to the proceeding follower within the platoon the agent instructs the vehicle to switch
the steering controller to automatic. Finally, the joining vehicle confirms the successful
joining procedure to the leader. When the joining vehicle receives a reply back from
the leader, it deduces that the the joining goal has been achieved. The following code
shows a simplified plan of the agent code for when the joining vehicle switches its speed
controller from manual to automatic:
+! j o i n i n g (X, Y ) : {B name (X) , B j o i n _ a g r e e m e n t (X, Y) , B changed_ lane ,
~B s p e e d _ c o n t r , ~ B s t e e r i n g _ c o n t r , ~B j o i n i n g _ d i s t a n c e }
<− +! s p e e d _ c o n t r ( 1 ) , ∗ j o i n i n g _ d i s t a n c e ;
Here: +! joining (X, Y) indicates the addition of the goal to join to the platoon;
clauses within {. . .} states the conditions about the agent’s beliefs which must be true
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such as a join agreement belief for joining behind the follower Y (B join_agreement(X,
Y)); and +! speed_contr (1), ∗ joining_distance , called the ’body’ of a plan, is a set
of deeds the agent performs for execution of the plan. +! speed_contr (1) adds a new
goal for switching the speed controller to automatic and ∗ joining_distance indicates
that the execution of the plan is suspended until the joining vehicle reduces the gap with
its immediate follower.
Given agent code, one can specify the agent properties with respect to beliefs, goals,
and actions and then verify them using the AJPF model checker. As mentioned earlier,
due to our modular verification approach we could skip the re-verification of previous
platooning properties. An example of a safety property is as follows:
 ( G X joining (X,Y) & ¬B X join_agreement (X,Y) )
→  ¬D X perf(speedcontroller(1))
(1)
where X refers to a joining vehicle that has a goal to join to a platoon, in front of a
platoon follower Y. G X joining (X,Y) indicates a joining goal that agent X tries to
achieve. B X join_agreement (X,Y) indicates the join agreement belief of agent X, and
D X perf(speed_controller(1)) indicates the action of perf(speed_controller(1)) that
agent X performs. This property denotes that if a vehicle never believes it has received
a confirmation from the leader, then it never switches to the automatic speed controller.
3.2 Continuous Controller
In the original architecture, we combined the continuous controller and the environment
into one entity. For example, we did not distinguish between interactions of the agent
with the actuators of the autonomous system and interactions with the human driver.
In both cases, the main feature of the interaction we were concerned with was the time
taken for the controller or environment to react.
As shown in Fig. 3b, we now refine the continuous controller and the environment
into three sub-components. We introduce two controllers, one referring to the timing
aspects and the continuous behaviour of the vehicle, and the other specifically to control
actuations with respect to space.
The refinement extends the previous environment with a model of potential col-
lision, which will be defined in the subsequent section. It removes the nondetermin-
istic failure of changing lane from the continuous controller that implicitly modelled
the existence of such a potential collision. A part of the continuous controller automa-
ton that has changed in our refinement step is shown in Fig. 4. Note that synchronisa-
tion channels are changed from changing_lane to phy_changing_lane since the refined
continuous controller is synchronised with the spatial controller, while in the previous
controller it was synchronised with the agent automaton. We elaborate on the spatial
controller in the following section.
3.3 Introducing Space
In this section, we present the concrete instantiation of the spatial controller, as well as
the translation into timed and untimed automata for verification purposes. To that end,
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Fig. 4: Abstract and Refined Continuous Controller Automata
we formalise the ideas presented in Sect. 2 on the spatial model. However, we will not
go into all of the details of the model of space, but refer to previous work [15,21].
We fix a set of lanes L = {1, . . . ,n} and for simplicity assume the motorway to be
infinitely long. The dimension in the direction of the motorway, called the extension,
is thus modelled by the real numbers R. At any point in time, each vehicle c is then
spatially characterised by its position pos(c)∈R, its physical size ps(c)∈R, its braking
distance, i.e., the distance it needs to come to a standstill bd(c) ∈ R, as well as the
lanes it reserves res(c) ⊆ L and claims clm(c) ⊆ L. These sets of lanes are subject to
certain conditions (e.g., the set of claims has to be a singleton and has to be adjacent to
the current reservation, etc.), which we will not expand upon Each vehicle c can also
perform certain actions, in particular
c(c,n): create a claim on lane n
r(c): change an existing claim into a reservation
wdc(c): remove/withdraw an existing claim
wdr(c,n): shrink its reservation to only be on lane n
While the original defintion of the spatial model allowed for arbitrarily many, even infi-
nite, of these instantaneous transitions at any point in time, we now restrict the possible
transitions such that after each transition an amount of time greater than zero has to
pass. We add this constraint to enforce the permanency of spatial changes on the road.
Subsequently, we will refer to this model of space as R.
Using these abstract definitions as the semantics, we defined a specification logic
with an emphasis on multi-lane traffic [15]. However, in this work we will not require
the full logic, and hence we only explain the necessary details. One main feature of the
logic is that it employs local reasoning, that is, a formula is evaluated with respect to a
finite part of the motorway, as perceived by a distinguished vehicle, which is sometimes
referred to as the ego vehicle. This finite perception is called the view of a vehicle, and
consists of a subset of the lanes, as well as a finite interval of the real numbers, the
extension of the view. We employ two spatial atoms re(c) and cl(c), which denote that
the current view consists of a single lane and a non-empty extension, and is fully occu-
pied by the reservation (claim, respectively) of c. Furthermore, we use a single modality
somewhere 〈ϕ〉, which denotes that the formula ϕ holds somewhere on the space under
consideration. With these specific definitions, and standard first-order operators, we can
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x≤ tdl
C
x≤ tlc
change_lane_join?/c(ego,n±1)
l := n±1;x := 0
change_lane_leave?/c(ego,n±1)
l := n±1;x := 0
x> 0
abort!/wdc(ego)
0 < x< tdl ;¬∃c : pc(c,ego)
phys_changing_lane!/r(ego)
phys_changed_lane?
x> 0
changed_lane!
/wdr(ego, l)
n := l
Fig. 5: Spatial Controller for Joining and Leaving a Platoon (tdl < tlc)
express the following two formulas.
cc≡ ¬∃c : c 6= ego∧〈re(ego)∧ re(c)〉
pc(c,ego)≡ c 6= ego∧〈cl(ego)∧ (re(c)∨ cl(c))〉
Formula cc denotes the existence of a vehicle c whose reservation overlaps with the
reservation of ego. According to our explanations above, this would amount to an unsafe
situation. For simplicity, we term such situations as collisions, even though c may only
have encroached upon the braking distance of ego or vice versa. Formula pc(c,ego)
denotes that the claim of ego overlaps with either the claim of c or its reservation. This
may result in an unsafe situation, if ego changed its claim into a reservation. Hence,
pc(c,ego) allows us to identify potentially unsafe situations, and so take measures to
mitigate this.
To model the spatial behaviour of a vehicle joining or leaving the platoon, we
will use a type-amended timed automata called automotive-controlling timed automata
(ACTA) [16]. These augment timed automata with the possibility to use spatial formu-
las as guards and invariants, as well as to use the spatial actions described above at the
transitions. Figure 5 shows the controller in terms of an ACTA, where ego refers to the
vehicle the controller is implemented in. The upper part of the controller is concerned
with the vehicle trying to join a platoon, while the lower part handles the leaving of a
platoon. The actions change_lane_join, change_lane_leave, changed_lane, and abort
are used to communicate with the decision making agent. The first two actions are used
by the agent to initiate the corresponding manoeuvre, while the spatial controller uses
changed_lane and abort to indicate a successful and unsuccessful lane-change manoeu-
vre, respectively. The channel phys_changed_lane is a direct communication link with
the continuous controller, which indicates that steering onto the new lane was success-
ful. Observe that we chose to encode the necessary delays after the transitions into this
controller as well via the clock x.
For the verification of the other components, we need to provide abstractions from
the ACTA given above into both an untimed automaton, and a standard timed automa-
ton. To abstract from both the timing and spatial definitions, we remove all references
to clocks, spatial formulas and spatial actions, i.e., we only keep the discrete actions,
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and therefore maintain the order of actions. In this way, we create a simple finite au-
tomaton which serves as the abstraction of the spatial controller that can only be used
during the verification of the agent programs. The translation into timed automata is
slightly more involved. We employ a global set of identifiers for each vehicle. In fact,
this set was already used to identify the different vehicles by parameterising the con-
tinuous controllers [18]. Hence, we replace each occurrence of ego with the parameter
id. Furthermore, we introduce a global array c of Boolean values, where the identifiers
serve as the indices, and each entry denotes whether the corresponding vehicle currently
possesses a claim. Whether a vehicle is currently engaged in a lane-change manoeuvre,
i.e., whether it uses two lanes at once for its reservation, is indicated by a variable r,
which is local to each controller.
However, since claims and reservations are strongly tied together, we also need to
define an abstraction of the road’s behaviour. To that end, we chose to use a very simple
abstraction: a potential collision can only happen, if at least one vehicle currently holds
a claim. Furthermore, a potential collision has to last an arbitrary amount of time greater
than zero before it can be resolved. This is a result of the assumption on the vehicles
dynamics to be continuous and the necessary delays after the spatial transitions. Note
that a potential collision can happen due to two reasons: either a spatial transition or
the different velocities of two cars. In both cases, our model and its assumptions ensure
that the situation persists for a non-zero amount of time. We can formalise these two
properties with the following abstraction of the road’s behaviour, as shown in Fig. 6. In
this figure, y is a clock used to enforce the timing behaviour.
c[2]∨·· ·∨ c[max]
pc= 1;y= 0
y> 0
pc= 0
Fig. 6: Abstraction of Spatial Behaviour on the Road
With these changes, the timed abstraction of the spatial controller is as shown in
Fig. 7. The timing behaviour is exactly as in the original automaton. Hence, if we can
verify the other controllers in the presence of this controller, we can guarantee the safety
of the overall system.
Finally, we need to define how the agent program and the continuous controller
can be abstracted for the verification of the spatial properties. To that end, observe that
the specification logic for the spatial properties does not contain modalities to refer to
timings or decisions of the agent. That is, for the spatial properties, we do not refer to
either time constraints or the specific goals or intentions of the agent. Hence, for spatial
verification, we use the untimed automaton of the continuous controller which was also
used during the verification of the agent. Similarly, the untimed abstraction automaton
of the agent program used in the verification of timing aspects can be re-used during
the verification of spatial properties.
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x≤ tdl
wait
C
x≤ tlc
change
change_lane_join?/c[id] = 1
x := 0
change_lane_leave?/c[id] = 1
x := 0
x> 0
abort!/c[id] = 0
0 < x< tdl ;¬pc
phys_changing_lane!
c[id] = 0;r = 1
phys_changed_lane?
x> 0
changed_lane!
/r = 0
Fig. 7: Timed Abstraction of Spatial Controller of Fig. 5 (tdl < tlc)
Lemma 1. Let Ai, Vi and Si be the agent program, continuous controller and spatial
controller, respectively, of vehicle i, with i ∈ {1,2}. Furthermore let Comm12 be the
component modelling the communication of vehicle 1 and 2. Let S′i be the abstrac-
tions of the spatial controllers (Fig. 7), A′i the abstractions of the agent programs, R′
the abstraction of the road (Fig. 6), and ϕt a formula describing a time property. If
A′1‖V1‖S′1‖Comms12‖A′2‖V2‖S′2‖R′ |= ϕt then A1‖V1‖S1‖Comms12‖A2‖V2‖S2‖R |= ϕt .
Proof (Sketch). The timing behaviour of Ai and A′i is the same (cf. [18]). Furthermore,
the timing constraints on Si and S′i are also the same. Now, after each spatial transition,
in the original Si, some time has to pass. In both Si and its abstraction S′i, every time
a clock is reset the guards on the outgoing transitions of the target state s require the
automaton to stay in s for some time. Finally, if the abstraction R flags a potential
collision, then the original system possesses a trace containing at least one claim for a
vehicle. Let us assume this claim is of vehicle 2. Then, all possible traces starting from
this configuration are also possible in the abstraction R. Hence, whenever we can prove
that the abstraction satisfies a timed formula ϕt , the original system also satisfies ϕt . uunionsq
Lemma 2. Let Ai, Vi and Si be the agent program, continuous controller and spatial
controller, respectively, of vehicle i, with i ∈ {1,2}. Furthermore let Comm12 be the
component modelling the communication of vehicle 1 and 2. Now let A′i and V ′i be
the abstractions without references to spatial properties as described above. Then, if
A′1‖V ′1‖S1‖Comms12‖A′2‖V ′2‖S2‖R′ |=ϕs then A1‖V1‖S1‖Comms12‖A2‖V2‖S2‖R |=ϕs.
Proof (Sketch). Again, this holds since the abstractions A′i and V ′i allow for more be-
haviour than the original automata. Furthermore, the spatial properties may neither refer
to the internals of the agent program, nor to time aspects of the system. uunionsq
4 Verification of Vehicle Platooning
In this section, we explain the verification approach built on the methodology presented
in Sect. 3.3 On one hand, we did not have to re-run most of our verification methods
3 The model and the verified properties can be found at https://github.com/
VerifiableAutonomy/AgentPlatooning
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from our previous work, particularly running AJPF, since we only refined non-agent
parts of the system. On the other hand, we needed to show that the refinement step
was valid by proving proof obligations. In the following, we first identify a set of proof
obligations that we proved to verify our refinement step. We then denote the spatial
properties that we checked for our concrete vehicle platooning. We also point out those
parts of the system that remained unchanged and consequently not re-verified. Finally,
we prove that the spatial controller which is added to our concrete vehicle platooning is
a safe fragment of the space model in [15].
4.1 Proof Obligations
The refinement step allows us to introduce more details about the spatial properties of
vehicle platooning. However, we need to ensure that the new details do not violate the
system invariants, and do not introduce deadlocks. The checking needs to be considered
for both verification of agent and timing behaviours. The untimed abstraction of the spa-
tial controller only allows the same set of sequences of interactions with the agent. This
means that we did not change the structure of the agent programs themselves; neither
the leader nor the follower, i.e., the refinement step is correct wrt. agent behaviour. To
discuss the correctness of our refinement step wrt. temporal behaviour, we check four
main proof obligations, shown in Fig. 8. The first three obligations are verified using the
Uppaal model checker, followed by a discussion of the correctness of the fourth obliga-
tion. We instantiated the agent timed automata, spatial, and continuous controllers for
a platoon of four vehicles and one leader. We choose an arbitrary vehicle, for example
vehicle 2, to denote our proof obligations and properties of interest, and described these
with respect to this vehicle. Note that a2 is the follower agent program as implemented
in vehicle 2 and s2 is the lane-change (spatial) controller of the same vehicle.
Deadlock Freedom A not deadlock
Possible to join and leave E♦ a2. join_completed
E♦ a2.leave_completed
Time bound for joining and leaving A a2. join_completed imply
(a2.process_time>= 50∧a2.process_time< 90)
A a2.leave_completed imply
(a2.process_time>= 30∧a2.process_time< 50)
No new communication transaction changes were restricted to continuous and spatial
controllers
Fig. 8: Proof Obligations, with formalisation in timed temporal logic 4
The first proof obligation that we verified was deadlock freedom. We showed that
our refinement step was not too restrictive. The second proof obligation ensures that
adding the spatial controller does not decrease the functionality of the platooning, and
4 A=“all paths”; E= “exist a path”; =“Always”; ♦=“Eventually”
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we checked whether joining and leaving procedures can occur. In the previous Uppaal
model of platooning, we assumed that change lane could happen in 20±CH_L_B where
CH_L_B was reflecting the uncertainty of the changing lane. In our refinement, the
lower bound remains the same, however, the upper bound splits to two waiting times
for free space tdl (cf. Fig. 5) and the uncertainty of the changing lane (CH_L_B− tdl).
Therefore, we could show that the time bound of joining and leaving remain the same
as the previous model (The third proof obligation in Fig. 8).
In the refinement step, we defined two new channels representing the communica-
tion between the spatial controller and continuous controller, phy_changing_lane and
phy_changed_lane. As these channels are not used in any other parts of the system, we
can guarantee that no new communication transition is added to any other part of our
model.
4.2 Spatial Properties of Vehicle Platooning
We can verify that if a vehicle requested a lane-change, i.e., the spatial controller reaches
the wait state (cf. Fig. 7), and still perceives a potential collision after the waiting time
tdl , then the corresponding manoeuvre in the agent program will fail.
(s2.wait ∧ pc∧ s2.x== tld)−→ (a2. f ailed_to_ join∨a2. f ailed_to_leave) (2)
In this formula −→ denotes the “leads-to” operator of Uppaal. Observe that we cannot
identify whether the join manoeuvre or the leave manoeuvre failed, since the spatial
controller acts similarly for both manoeuvres. Note that identification of the manoeuvre
can be easily implemented by adding a flag to the spatial controller automaton. We can
also show that, whenever the spatial controller chooses that a lane-change can be safely
initiated, it does not perceive a potential collision on the road. Furthermore, as long as
it stays in this state, no potential collision can arise.
A¬(s2.change∧ pc) (3)
This property shows that the space on the road as formalised in Fig. 6 is “well-behaved”
within this abstraction, since a potential collision can only happen, if a vehicle possesses
a claim. However, if the controller of vehicle 2 is in state change, it already changed
its claim to a new reservation. The time needed to verify these properties was similar
to the time needed for the proof obligations, which, compared to our previous attempt,
changed negligibly.
4.3 Spatial Safety Property
The main property that the spatial controller must ensure is that the space used by two
different vehicles is disjoint. That is, it has to ensure that the formula cc as shown
in Sect. 3.3 is an invariant of the system. To that end, we re-use a verification result
[21] of a much more general controller specification encoded in the theorem prover
Isabelle/HOL [24]. Safety in this work means that ∀e : safe(e) is a global invariant,
where safe(e) is defined as follows.
safe(e)≡¬∃c : c 6= e∧〈re(e)∧ re(c)〉
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Observe that the modality is similar in intent to the box-modality used in the previous
sections, in that it quantifies over arbitrary transition sequences, but it does not allow
us to specify timing constraints. To prove this property to be an invariant, we need two
main assumptions:
1. All vehicles keep their distance to the vehicles in their front and back
2. All vehicles adhere to a certain protocol for changing lanes with respect to the
platoon under consideration
We do not elaborate on the first assumption. However, the second assumption is that,
the vehicle must not mutate its claim into a reservation, in case of a potential collision
during the phase where a claim is held. Formally, we have the following constraint,
where r(d) quantifies over the transition where the vehicle d changes its claim into a
reservation and c ranges only over the vehicles within the platoon.
LC≡ ∀d : ∃c : pc(c,d)→r(d)⊥
For simplicity, assume that the platoon under consideration consists of two vehicles as
in Sect. 3. That is, the platoon P consists of the following components.
P≡ A1‖V1‖S1‖Comms12‖A2‖V2‖S2‖R
Now, let JS1K and JS2K be the possible behaviours allowed by the controllers S1 and S2
as presented in Sect. 3.3. Since the only transition to change a claim into a reservation
is guarded by the potential collision check, we have for i ∈ {1,2},
JSiK∩{tr | tr |= ∃c : pc(c, i)∧♦r(i)>}= /0
That is, since the behaviour of the parallel product of S1 and S2 is a subset of both JS1K
and JS2K, we also get
JS1‖S2K∩{tr | tr |= ∃c : pc(c, i)∧♦r(i)>}= /0 .
Since the other controllers may only further restrict the possible behaviour of the pla-
toon, we also have
JPK∩{tr | tr |= ∃c : pc(c, i)∧♦r(i)>}= /0 .
Due to our assumption on the behaviour of all other vehicles, we can infer that JPK
does not contain any traces where other vehicles create a reservation during a potential
collision. Hence, we can strengthen this property even further.
JPK∩{tr | tr |= ∃c,d : pc(c,d)∧♦r(d)>}= /0 ,
which in particular implies JPK ⊆ S. This yields JPK |= LC, which has been shown to
ensure that P |= ∀e : safe(e). Hence, our controller is a refinement of the general case,
which was shown to be safe.
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5 Concluding Remarks
Contribution. We presented a verification technique for autonomous systems based
on the use of a hybrid agent architecture. The decomposition of concerns inherent in
this architecture allows us to define different aspects of the system within different for-
malisms, which are tied together by the communication structure of the system and its
timing constraints. For each of the formalisms we defined a translation into an abstrac-
tion compatible with the other formalisms. In this way, we can concentrate on each
aspect in turn during verification, which both reduces the state space, and allows us to
use different techniques for each aspect.
Decomposition techniques often isolate the single components and replace the inter-
action with the other components by assumptions, which are then shown to be guaran-
teed by the respective components [22]. In contrast, during each step of the verification,
we keep the general structure of the overall system. That is, we do not really decom-
pose the system, but abstract from different parts during each step. This eliminates the
need to infer the behaviour of the single components, e.g., in the form of guarantees. Of
course, this also means that large parts of the state space are retained during verification,
in comparison to techniques which replace the other components with the guarantees
they keep. However, we have shown that our approach is both feasible for autonomous
systems, as well as that it scales well if new aspects are to be verified.
Related Work Müller et al. presented a technique to verify safety of hybrid systems
[23] based on the identification of components. In their approach, they need to define
and verify contracts for the behaviour of each component, which may simply assumed
to be true during the verification of other components. In this manner, they can reduce
the verification task for each component. Their systems need to be defined within a sin-
gle formalism, differential dynamic logic [25], and are verified with the distinguished
tool KeymaeraX [13]. In contrast, we can rather easily incorporate new formalisms
into our approach, as evidenced by the introduction of the lane-change controller and
the necessary spatial formalism. This is due to the minimised interaction between our
controllers, in the form of time and communication. In this way, we may use the ver-
ification techniques suitable for the corresponding subsystems, as long as we have a
sensible abstraction and refinement results for each system.
Abstraction and refinement techniques are often employed for verification purposes.
For example, in counter-example guided abstraction (CEGAR) [9], the verification
starts with a very broad abstraction. If a counter-example is found to be spurious, i.e.,
it is not viable in the original system, the corresponding part of the state-space has to
be refined to eliminate this example. That is, the system is analysed in a top-down fash-
ion, from the broadest possible abstraction to an explicit description of the system. Our
method proceeds in a somewhat orthogonal way. Instead of building an abstraction of
the system as a whole, we build several abstractions according to the type of property
we intend to verify.
The concept of abstraction and refinement relations is used prominently in Event-B
[1]. Banach and Butler have used a hybrid extension of Event-B to model and verify
controllers used in autonomous driving [3,4]. However, these controllers have been ver-
ified on their own, and the interactions between them have not been verified.
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